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Last Update: Friday, Feb 20, 2026 16:42 [IST]
Artificial intelligence today is not merely a technology race; it is a power structure. Control over chips, cloud infrastructure, and large language models remains concentrated in the hands of a few American corporations. For many countries, participation in the AI revolution increasingly means plugging into systems designed, owned and governed elsewhere. The phrase “digital colonialism” may sound dramatic, but it captures a real anxiety about dependence in the age of algorithms.
At the India AI Impact Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed a different imagination of AI — one built on open code, shared development and affordable, scalable solutions. The message was clear: technology should not be hoarded as a strategic weapon but democratised as a public good. It is a powerful counterpoint to the closed, proprietary ecosystems that dominate global AI discourse. Yet the challenge lies not in articulation, but in execution.
India’s ambition to build a resilient domestic AI ecosystem — from chip manufacturing to homegrown models — is timely. The country’s demographic dividend, vast market and diverse data environments provide unique advantages. If AI tools can work at India’s scale and complexity, they can potentially work anywhere.
However, reality tempers rhetoric. India continues to depend heavily on partnerships with global technology giants such as Google and Microsoft for infrastructure, capital and expertise. While such collaborations are pragmatic, they also underline a deeper truth: technological self-reliance cannot be achieved overnight, nor through speeches alone.
More fundamentally, AI cannot thrive in isolation from broader economic reform. Bureaucratic red tape still frustrates start-ups. Skill deficits remain a barrier despite years of emphasis on digital training. Research funding, semiconductor capabilities and reliable power infrastructure lag behind global leaders. Without tackling these structural weaknesses, the dream of sitting at the “AI high table” risks becoming symbolic rather than substantive.
If India truly seeks to offer an alternative to concentrated technological power, it must move beyond summit declarations and confront entrenched inefficiencies. Open code must be matched by open opportunity. Shared development must rest on strong domestic capacity.
In an era where trade is weaponised and tech supremacy shapes geopolitics, India’s balancing role could be significant. But leadership in AI will not come from vision alone. It will come from difficult reforms that turn aspiration into capability.