Modi in Tel Aviv: Tracing the Evolution of India–Israel Ties

DIPAK KURMI

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s scheduled visit to Israel on February 25 and 26 marks a consequential moment in India’s evolving engagement with West Asia. It will be his first trip to the country since his landmark 2017 visit, which had decisively lifted India–Israel ties out of diplomatic caution and into full public view. Nearly a decade later, the geopolitical context surrounding this visit is far more volatile. West Asia stands on edge amid the prospect of a potential US–Iran confrontation, while the Gaza Strip continues to reel under the strain of a fragile ceasefire following prolonged conflict. Against this tense regional backdrop, the visit assumes significance that extends well beyond routine bilateral diplomacy, compelling observers to revisit the long arc of India–Israel relations and the strategic calculations now guiding New Delhi.

India’s engagement with Israel has always evolved through careful calibration rather than abrupt shifts. New Delhi formally recognised the state of Israel soon after its creation in 1948, yet full diplomatic relations were delayed for more than four decades. This prolonged hesitation reflected India’s historical commitment to the Palestinian cause and its broader positioning within the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab world. A pivotal turning point arrived in January 1992 during the visit of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to India. In discussions with Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, Arafat was informed that formal ties with Israel would actually strengthen India’s ability to advocate for Palestinian interests. His public endorsement of India’s sovereign right to recognise Israel removed a major political obstacle. Within ten days of his remarks, India and Israel formally established diplomatic relations on January 29, 1992, setting the stage for a steady if cautious partnership.

Even before full diplomatic ties, limited security cooperation had surfaced in moments of strategic necessity. During the 1962 war with China, India quietly sourced Israeli military equipment, though the engagement remained episodic and largely discreet. The relationship acquired far greater depth during the 1999 Kargil conflict. As the Indian Air Force struggled to neutralise Pakistani positions entrenched in the high-altitude terrain, Israel responded swiftly to India’s urgent request for precision-guided munitions. Drawing from its emergency reserves, Tel Aviv reportedly dispatched critical supplies within days. This decisive assistance left a lasting imprint on India’s strategic thinking and triggered a visible expansion of high-level political exchanges. External affairs minister Jaswant Singh led the first major bilateral visit to Israel in 2000, followed closely by home minister L. K. Advani. To soften domestic political criticism, the government also facilitated visits by figures such as Jyoti Basu and Najma Heptullah, signalling that engagement with Israel was becoming a bipartisan reality rather than an ideological departure.

The early 2000s witnessed steady institutionalisation of defence and security cooperation, highlighted by the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to India in 2003. However, during the subsequent Congress-led United Progressive Alliance years, the public articulation of the partnership became more restrained. When external affairs minister S. M. Krishna visited Israel in 2012, the official emphasis rested largely on agriculture, science, and commerce, while defence cooperation was deliberately kept low-profile. This dual-track approach allowed India to maintain its traditional support for Palestinian statehood while quietly expanding strategic engagement with Israel.

The arrival of Modi in power in 2014 marked a clear shift toward greater openness and political signalling in the bilateral relationship. Within months of assuming office, Modi met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, ending a decade-long gap in top-level interactions. A series of high-level visits followed in quick succession. Home minister Rajnath Singh travelled to Israel in November 2014, President Pranab Mukherjee undertook the first-ever presidential visit from India in 2015, and external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj followed in early 2016. These exchanges indicated that India was no longer inclined to treat ties with Israel as diplomatically sensitive or politically delicate.

Modi’s own visit to Israel in July 2017 proved transformational. It was the first standalone trip by an Indian prime minister since the establishment of diplomatic relations, and notably, Modi broke with precedent by not coupling the visit with a stop in Palestine. The symbolism was unmistakable: India was prepared to pursue relations with Israel on their own merit rather than through the prism of regional balancing. Netanyahu’s return visit to India in January 2018 further cemented this new warmth. Since Netanyahu’s sixth electoral victory, the two leaders have reportedly interacted frequently, reflecting an increasingly personalised strategic rapport. The relationship has expanded beyond defence into sectors such as artificial intelligence, agriculture technology, water management, and innovation ecosystems. The signing of new defence understandings and the launch of free trade negotiations in November 2025 underscored the widening economic dimension of the partnership.

Yet the regional environment surrounding Modi’s latest visit is markedly more complex than in 2017. The Abraham Accords, brokered during the first presidency of Donald Trump, opened the door to partial normalisation between Israel and several Arab states, subtly reshaping West Asia’s diplomatic geometry. However, the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza dramatically destabilised the region. The conflict, which reportedly resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and widespread devastation in the Gaza Strip, has left behind an uneasy truce that remains vulnerable to collapse. The question of disarming Hamas continues to hang over the ceasefire, making the security environment highly fluid.

Compounding the uncertainty are escalating tensions involving Iran. The region witnessed a brief but intense 12-day confrontation between Israel and Iran in June 2025, during which the United States conducted strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Washington has since increased its military posture around Iran, fuelling speculation about a wider confrontation. In this volatile setting, Modi’s decision to proceed with the Israel visit reflects both diplomatic confidence and calculated risk. New Delhi must carefully balance its deepening strategic partnership with Israel against its historically significant ties with Iran and the broader Arab world, particularly given India’s energy dependencies and diaspora interests in the Gulf.

For India, Israel remains a critical defence and technology partner. Israeli systems have become deeply embedded in India’s military modernisation, spanning surveillance platforms, missile defence, drones, and electronic warfare capabilities. Cooperation has also expanded into cybersecurity, an area that drew public attention during the Pegasus revelations. Economically, Israel occupies a meaningful place in India’s westward connectivity ambitions, including the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor. From precision agriculture projects in Indian states to joint innovation funds, the partnership has steadily diversified beyond its earlier security-centric profile.

At the same time, the optics of the visit will be closely scrutinised across West Asia. Countries such as Iran will watch carefully for any signals suggesting a strategic tilt. India has traditionally prided itself on maintaining multi-vector relationships in the region, balancing ties with Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf monarchies. The success of Modi’s diplomacy will depend on sustaining this delicate equilibrium while continuing to harvest the tangible benefits of cooperation with Israel. The challenge is not merely bilateral but systemic: how to deepen a high-value partnership without narrowing strategic space elsewhere.

Domestic political considerations also intersect with the visit’s timing. Netanyahu, facing sustained opposition pressure at home, is likely to project Modi’s presence as evidence of Israel’s enduring international partnerships despite regional turbulence. For the Indian leadership, the trip reinforces the narrative of India as an increasingly consequential global actor willing to engage partners across complex theatres. The symbolism will therefore resonate on multiple levels, from defence cooperation and technological collaboration to broader geopolitical signalling.

Ultimately, Modi’s February visit to Israel represents more than diplomatic continuity; it reflects the maturation of a relationship that has travelled a long distance from quiet caution to strategic candour. The journey from India’s hesitant recognition of Israel in 1948 to today’s openly acknowledged partnership illustrates how geopolitical realities can reshape long-held foreign policy postures. Yet the moment is fraught with uncertainty. West Asia is in flux, great-power tensions are sharpening, and regional fault lines remain deeply entrenched. In navigating this landscape, India is attempting a careful diplomatic high-wire act, seeking to expand strategic partnerships without compromising its broader regional balance. Whether this calibrated approach can withstand the mounting pressures of a turbulent West Asia will determine the true significance of Modi’s latest visit.

(Views are personal. Email: dipakkurmiglpltd@gmail.com)